How human rights defenders are faring with digital security tools in African contexts

Digital security tools can save lives, especially the lives of human rights defenders who work in hostile contexts. In politically repressive and low-resource environments, these tools can also act as a buffer between enforced disappearances and physical safety of defenders. This reinforces the need for secure tools to reflect the needs of those they are meant to protect. 

I recently authored and launched a research report with support from Open Technology Fund and HURIDOCS, which presents a harsh yet optimistic picture of the challenges human rights defenders face in using digital security tools in African contexts. The report focuses on the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), Kenya, Senegal and Zimbabwe. It identifies various intersecting risks faced by human rights defenders, such as adverse political environments, unlawful surveillance, poor access to digital infrastructure and low digital security literacy. 

The report relies on 52 survey responses and interviews with both human rights defenders and developers of digital security tools. More than half of the human rights defenders surveyed were women. The tools examined were Awala, Butter Box, Letro, Mobile Surveillance Monitor (MSM), Shira, SMSWithoutBorders (RelaySMS and DekuSMS), TAILS, Tella, Tor VPN, and Uwazi.

Watch the webinar and launch of the research report’s recording, which included opening remarks from Wei Fan (Senior Program Manager at OTF) and Danna Ingleton (Executive Director at HURIDOCS), the reflections from three human rights defenders, Arséne Tungali (Democratic Republic of the Congo), Yeukai Munetsi (Zimbabwe) and Christina Khabuya (Kenya), and moderation and closing remarks by Yolanda Booyzen (Director of Development and Communications at HURIDOCS).

Human rights defenders face multi-layered political and socio-economic barriers using digital security tools

More than 65% of the defenders surveyed expressed that they live under state-sponsored surveillance. Key findings revealed that not only do human rights defenders face a hostile political and legal environment, but they also contend with low-cost devices that lack robust security features. In addition to these, one of the defenders in DRC noted that they are unable to express themselves or carry out their work for fear of being labelled as terrorists. Another human rights defender in Zimbabwe further shared that “High data costs, erratic power supply, government-imposed internet shutdowns, and unlawful surveillance threaten freedom of expression, access to information, and the safety of HRDs.”

In addition to these, only 20% of human rights defenders engaged have advanced digital security skills, while 80% have basic and intermediate skills on how to use digital security tools. A particular concern is that of women human rights defenders (WHRDs) who face risks such as hate speech, doxing, sexual harassment and non-consensual sharing of intimate images.

“The challenge is for women HRDs operating at community level especially in rural areas, who have no access to reliable, affordable and consistent internet and suitable gadgets.”
– WHRD

Notwithstanding these barriers, human rights defenders highlighted the digital security needs that they would like to be addressed. Some of the major digital security needs of human rights defenders include:

• Ease of use: HRDs seek out tools that have simple and easily accessible user interfaces that require minimal technical skills.
• Affordability and accessibility: HRDs noted the need for tools that have free and low-cost features, particularly for those who work in rural or conflict settings.
• Offline functionality: Digital security tools should be capable of operating without constant internet access and have low-bandwidth access.
• Localisation: Tools should be made available in local languages for use and for providing feedback to facilitate usability across diverse linguistic communities.
• Security and anonymity: Tools must also include strong encryption, secure communication channels, and anonymity features for HRDs working in high-risk political environments and underserved contexts.

Developers also face barriers but are willing to collaborate

The report found that more than 60% of the defenders surveyed have no prior engagement with tool developers. Furthermore, the survey responses shared with digital security tool developers highlighted two major themes, namely feedback mechanisms and their responsiveness to issues raised by defenders and their interest in collaboration. 

Regarding feedback mechanisms and responsiveness, more than 70% of developers shared that they utilise feedback mechanisms. For example, SMSWithoutBorders accepts feedback using GitHub and emails, while Awala, Lethro and MSM accept feedback from social media, emails and a submission portal. Most of the tool developers also noted that due to limited resources, they usually have to prioritise their response to feedback. In addition, some of the tools, including Tella, Shira, Awala, Lethro and MSM have varying levels of technical complexity. 

Ninety-percent of the tool developers shared their optimism to collaborate with human rights defenders. They expressed that this can include co-design workshops, community-of-practice models, and periodic user engagement sessions. However, the optimism for collaboration is faced with barriers such as limited engagement between defenders and tool developers, resource constraints on both sides, lack of structured platforms for engagement and language and cultural gaps between defenders and tool developers.

Bridging the gap: towards a collaborative ecosystem between human rights defenders and tool developers

While the mixed-method survey for human rights defenders and tool developers reveals significant challenges in the use of digital security tools, there is an opportunity to create lasting collaboration between both communities. This opportunity is strengthened by both communities’ interest in working together while also engaging other key stakeholders such as civil society organisations, digital security trainers, funders and government actors. For example, tool developers will need to focus on co-designed tools aimed at improving the security and privacy of defenders, while civil society organisations and digital security trainers can commit to more structured and continuous digital security training programmes for defenders. Funders are also encouraged to provide more resources for long-term development and improvement of digital security tools and training, while government actors must carry out reforms and engage in surveillance in a rights-respecting manner. 

This report emphasises the critical role of digital security tools in keeping human rights defenders, especially those who work in politically repressive and underserved communities, safe. It found that this is not a responsibility that is limited to just human rights defenders or tool developers, but also involves other major stakeholders. The findings of this report will not only benefit human rights defenders who work in difficult conditions but also communities whose digital security is constantly at risk.